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RECENT DECISIONS
the mortgagee. Sound management would, in fact, vitiate the argument
that the vessel was unseaworthy and any creditor seeking to recover pre-
paid freights would, therefore, have to sue in contract and be forced to
settle for a smaller share of the proceeds. Even if the Morrisey decision
is simply viewed as one of a policy choice between two innocent parties,5°
the absence of the vessel owner's reckless acts would most likely be
enough for a court to then favor the ship mortgagee. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that ship mortgagees need not become unduly concerned about the
Morrisey decision, for the fact situation in itself is unique and affords a
possible basis for future distinction. If any principle is to be extracted
from this case, it is not particularly a legal one, but simply that investors
in the ship mortgage market primarily need to be more selective in their
investments, that shipowners primarily need to exercise better financial
methods, and that shippers primarily need to be more cautious before
agreeing to pre-pay freight charges.
Joseph A. Murphy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Congress, by appropriate legislation, may have
the power to punish private conspiracies that interfere with fourteenth
amendment rights.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
In a Federal indictment growing out of the murder of Negro Educator
Lemuel Penn on a Georgia highway, the prosecution alleged a conspiracy
by the six defendants to deprive Negro citizens of the free exercise and
enjoyment of "the right to the equal utilization, without discrimination
upon the basis of race, of public facilities in the vicinity of Athens,
Georgia, owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the State of
Georgia or any subdivision thereof."' Such alleged deprivation was said
to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment; 2 and of 18 U.S.C. § 241, which provides in part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or because of his not having exercised the
50. Admiralty can be viewed quite often in this regard. For example, the Supreme
Court seems to have decided Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), on this
basis. See also, Comment, 9 VI=a. L. REv. supra note 29.
1. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753 (1966). Paragraph two of the indictment.
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [Emphasis added.]
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same ... they shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both.'
The United States District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground
that it did not charge an offense under the laws of the United States.4
The Supreme Court reversed the district court, asserting that 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 clearly protects those constitutional rights of a citizen arising under
the fourteenth amendment; deeming such rights to be "secured" within
the meaning of the statute.'
Traditionally, the fourteenth amendment has been said to have refer-
ence to State action exclusively, and not to action of private individuals.'
The prohibitions of the amendment were expressly directed at the states,
and were thought "not to add anything to the rights of one citizen as
against another."7 The amendment contains an enforcement provision,
section 5, whereby Congress is authorized to enact "appropriate legis-
lation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the amendment.'
Despite this express grant, it was thought that Congress was without
constitutional power to enact laws punishing persons for conspiring to
deprive others of, for example, the equal protection of state laws.' Rather,
the "power" offered by section 5 was considered dormant in the absence
of the following circumstances:
... [U]ntil some State law has been passed; or some State ac-
tion, through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the
rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be
called into activity; for the prohibitions of the amendment are
against State laws and acts done under State authority.10
Historically, then, the effect of the fourteenth amendment has been
to merely place a curb on discriminatory "state action"-it has not been
3. This statute, upon which the government relied, originated as Section 6 of the Act of
May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140. It subsequently and successively became known as Section 5508
of the Revised Statutes of 1874-1878, Section 19 of the Criminal Code of 1909, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 51, 1926 edition; and is presently 18 U.S.C.A. § 241, 1948 edition.
4. United States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Ga. 1964).
5. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966), where the language of section 241
was said to embrace ". . . all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all of the
Constitution and all of the laws of the United States. There is no indication in the language
that the sweep of the section is confined to rights that are conferred by or 'flow from' the
Federal Government, as distinguished from those secured or confirmed or guaranteed by the
Constitution."
6. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
7. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
8. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article."
9. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
10. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
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interpreted as a positive command to the states to pass laws against pri-
vate discrimination.
According to the indictment in Guest, one of the means of accomplish-
ing the object of the conspiracy was ". . . by causing the arrest of Ne-
groes by means of false reports that such Negroes had committed criminal
acts. . . ."" In writing the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart
construed this allegation as being broad enough to cover a charge of ac-
tive connivance by agents of the State of Georgia in furthering the con-
spiracy. Stating ". . . that rights under the Equal Protection Clause itself
arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one acting
under the color of its authority," 2 the Court reasoned that state agents,
or persons acting under color of state authority, may have been among
those who "caused the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports"-or
engaged in other conduct amounting to official discrimination. The indict-
ment was upheld as sufficiently alleging "state participation," thereby
bringing the conspiracy within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court did not feel required to determine what minimum state "in-
volvement" would have to be proved at trial in order to convict the al-
leged conspirators under section 241. The opinion went no further than
to say that the involvement of the state need not be "exclusive or direct."' 3
Mr. justice Brennan, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas
joined, did not agree with the Court's limiting interpretation-that the
conspiracy indictment could be upheld because of the "allegation" of
state participation. 4 Concurring in the result, they focused on the power
of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment-the power
to enforce the provisions of the amendment-under which they would
treat section 241 as an example of "appropriate legislation" seeking to
11. The indictment, found in footnote 1 of Justice Stewart's opinion, 383 U.S. 745, 747
(1966), filed on October 16, 1964, included the following allegation:
It was a part of the plan and purpose of the conspiracy that its objects be achieved
by various means, including the following:
1. By shooting Negroes;
2. By beating Negroes;
3. By killing Negroes;
4. By damaging and destroying property of Negroes;
5. By pursuing Negroes in automobiles and threatening them with guns;
6. By making telephone calls to Negroes to threaten their lives, property, and
persons, and by making such threats in person;
7. By going in disguise on the highway and on the premises of other persons;
8. By causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes
had committed criminal acts; and
9. By burning crosses at night in public view.
All in violation of Section 241, Title 18, United States Code.
12. 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966).
13. Ibid.
14. 383 U.S. 745, 774 (1966).
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enforce a citizen's right to the equal utilization of state facilities. Such
a right was said to be created by and derived from the fourteenth amend-
ment:
The Fourteenth Amendment commands the State to provide
members of all races with equal access to the public facilities
it owns or manages, and the right of a citizen to use those facili-
ties without discrimination on the basis of race is a basic corol-
lary of this command.'"
A conspiracy against such a right, therefore, would be a conspiracy
against a right "secured ... by the Constitution" within the meaning of
section 241-regardless of any state participation in the conspiracy.
Three other Justices, 6 in a separate concurring opinion also thought it
appropriate to consider, in this case, whether Congress, under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, may legislate to prevent private denials of
a citizen's fourteenth amendment rights, ". . . such as the right to utilize
public facilities."' 7 In answer to this question they stated that "there now
can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress
to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-
that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."'"
If a state will not enforce laws by which private individuals shall be
prevented from contravening the rights of a citizen under the fourteenth
amendment, then it may be the duty of the United States Government, as
authorized by section 5 of that amendment, to do so.' 9 The language of
the fourteenth amendment is prohibitory; "but every prohibition implies
the existence of rights."2 In saying that a state shall not "deny" to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, can it not be
said that a state is making just such a denial when it fails, by acts of
omission, to prevent its own citizens from depriving their fellow-citizens
of rights derived from the fourteenth amendment.
In Guest, then, a majority of the Supreme Court 2' have expressed the
view that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment allows the United
States Government, by its own laws and by its own courts, to go into the
15. Id. at 780.
16. Mr. Justice Clark, with Justices Black and Fortas joining.
17. 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966).
18. Ibid.
19. See the Appendix in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807 (1966), containing the
remarks of Senator Pool of North Carolina on sponsoring that section of the Enforcement
Act of 1870 which is today known as 18 U.S.C. § 241.
20. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
21. The majority consists of the Justices joining Clark's opinion and the Justices
joining Brennan's opinion. The opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart construes section 241 as
applied here to require proof of active participation by state officers in the alleged
conspiracy.
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states for the purpose of vitalizing the amendment there-when the states
have not, by positive action, taken steps to protect those "rights" of a
citizen which are derived from the fourteenth amendment. This case
finds "the equal utilization of state facilities" to be among such derived
rights. What other positive rights may be so derived remains to be seen.
The concurring opinions suggest that section 5 may now be interpreted
as a grant of positive power authorizing Congress to implement the
fourteenth amendment by fashioning remedies designed to achieve civil
and political equality within all the states.
The need to find "state action" may be a loosening hobble on con-
gressional authority.22 In the future, federal law may be able to reach
private individuals who attempt to deprive a citizen of his fourteenth
amendment rights, although the role of the state be merely one of com-
pliance or "inaction." Such an interpretation would seem to seriously
threaten the existence of such problem areas as de facto segregated
schools and private-housing discrimination.
Thomas Patrick Ruane
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Initiative measure permitting discrimination in
the sale or rental of private housing held to be "state action" in violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (1966), cert. granted, - U.S. -
(1966) (No. 483).
Plaintiff Negroes sought a restraining order under sections 51 and 52 of
the California Civil Code (the Unruh Civil Rights Act)' to prevent the
defendants from discriminating according to race in the rental of an apart-
22. See, Time, Sept. 23, 1966, p. 76.
1. Civil Code, section 51:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and no matter
what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
Civil Code, section 52:
Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever makes any discrimi-
nation, distinction or restriction on account of color, race, religion, ancestry, or
national origin, contrary to the provisions of section 51 of this code, is liable
for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and two hundred fifty
dollars ($250) in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided
in Section 51 of this code.
Justice Peek, writing for the majority in Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (1966), cert.
grantedi - U.S. - (1966) (No. 483), states at 829, "On its face, this measure [Civ. Code
§§ 51-52] encompassed the activities of real estate brokers and an businesses selling or
leasing residential housing."
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